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HET'UM I BETWEEN THE MONGOL EMPIRE AND THE HOLY SEE

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Het'um I's history is linked, most often, to his relations with the Mongols: in order to protect his kingdom from devastating attacks, he decided to submit to the authority of the Great Khan. From the beginning, he had a difficult reign: initially, his wife, Zabel, refused to marry him, but in the end she was forced to accept Het'um as her husband. After being crowned, he had to face several Seljuk attacks which led to the Armenian submission to the sultan. And during his reign, the Orient had to face the Mongol invasions. It is to this last event that the present article is dedicated to.

Cilicia had dynamic relations with the papacy. Lewon I sought Innocent III's support during the war of the Antiochene succession, but after his death, the Het'umids did not continue to consolidate their relations with Rome. However, the defeat of the Seljuks in 1243 and the uncertainties which it brought for the Armenian kingdom led Het'um to seek the pope's support again. In the first years after 1241, the Holy See searched for various solutions to prepare for another Mongol invasion and to protect the Christian lands. One of them was represented by negotiations with the Oriental Churches with the purpose of bringing them under the authority of the Roman Church. In 1251 a council convened in Sis adopted the *filioque* doctrine, a concession towards the Holy See which most likely meant the fulfilment of some political objectives. Ten years later, after the Armenians from Cilicia participated in the Mongol invasion of Syria in 1259-1260, the king and the catholicos decided that the papal support was no longer needed. On the following pages I will attempt to present how Het'um I kept the balance between the Mongol Empire and the Holy See after the battle of Köse Dagh (1243). Also, I will address the following questions: why did he choose to

adopt the *filioque* doctrine? And why after 1260 the Armenians considered that Rome was no more a suitable ally?

Lewon I's death in 1219 prompted a war of succession in the Armenian kingdom. According to an agreement from 1193/94 between Lewon and Bohemond III, Alice, Rupen III's daughter, was to be married to Raymond, the eldest son of the Antiochene prince, and if the marriage produced a male child, he would inherit both the Armenian and the Latin principalities¹. Alice gave birth to a son, named Raymond-Rupen, and because his father had died, he was next in the line of succession to the Antiochene principality. Lewon prepared the union of the two states, thus he designated the child his heir and in 1210 crowned him *iunior rex*². After Raymond-Rupen entered Antioch in 1216, his relations with the Armenian king went cold for unknown reasons³. Thus, Lewon named his new-born daughter, Zabel, heiress to his kingdom. Soon, he died and various claimants fought for the Armenian throne. No matter how powerful they were, they all lost. John of Brienne lost any royal claim when his wife and son died⁴. Raymond-Rupen was defeated and died in prison⁵. Officially, the war was won by Zabel, but Kostandin Gundstapl, her regent, got the most out of it: in 1226 he married his son, Het'um to Lewon I's daughter⁶. It was not an easy marriage. Initially, Zabel took refuge in the fortress of Sarvandikar, under the control of

¹ **Smbat Sparapet**, *Տարեգիրք (Chronicle)*, Seropé Akelian, Venice, 1956, pp. 206–207; **Gerard Dédéyan**, *La chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1980, pp. 71–72; *Annales de Terre-Sainte*, **Reinhold Röhrich** and **Gaston Raynaud** (eds.), in *Archives de l'Orient latin*, tom. II, Paris, 1884, p. 434; *Chronique de Terre-Sainte*, in *Les Gestes des Chiprois. Recueil de chroniques françaises écrites en Orient aux XIIIe & XIVe siècles*, **Gaston Raynaud** (ed.), Genève, 1887, p. 15; *Chronique d'Er-noul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, **M.L. de Mas Latrie** (ed.), Paris, 1871, p. 321.

² **Wilbrandi de Oldenborg**, *Peregrinatio*, in *Peregrinatores medii aevi quatuor*, **J.C.M. Laurent** (ed.), Leipzig, 1864, p. 174, 178.

³ Lewon I had an argument with Raymond-Rupen and left Antioch with the help of the Templars. It seems that the bad entourage of the new prince of Antioch led to his deposition in 1219, see **Claude Cahen**, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque de croisade et la principauté franque d'Antioche*, Paris, Institute Français de Damas, 1940, p. 630.

⁴ **Oliver of Paderborn**, *The Capture of Damietta*, in *Crusade and Christendom. Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187–1291*, Jessalyn Bird, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell (eds.), Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, p. 197.

⁵ *Annales de Terre-Sainte*, p. 16; *Chronique de Terre Sainte*, p. 20; Հեթում Բ-ի տարեգրությունը (XIII դ.) (*Chronicle of Het'um II*), in *Մանր ժամանակագրություններ XIII–XVIII դդ.*, (*Minor chronicles*) **V. A. Hakobyan** (ed.), vol. I, Erevan, The Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1951, pp. 79–80.

⁶ **Smbat Sparapet**, p. 225; **Smbat-Dédéyan**, p. 96; **Kirakos Ganjakec'i**, *Պատմություն հայոց (Armenian history)*, K.A. Melik' – Ohanjanyan (ed.), Erevan, The Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1961, p. 189.

the Hospitallers, in an attempt to sever all ties with Kostandin and his son. However, the knights were compelled by the regent to abandon the fortress, thus Zabel had to accept to marry Het'um⁷. It seems that the problems continued to exist as the couple had their first child only in 1236⁸. But they needed to stay together, as the queen legitimized the authority of the king: in official documents Het'um's name appeared next to Zabel's⁹.

Lewon I's foreign policy was dominated by his desire to control the Principality of Antioch, thus he sought the pope's support¹⁰. However, his close links with Rome did not survive his death. Honorius III's backing for John of Brienne¹¹ and Raymond-Rupen¹² in the Armenian war of succession could have determined the Het'umids to loosen their ties with the papacy. The fact that Het'um and Zabel were crowned by the catholicos could also be a mark for certain changes regarding the foreign policy of the kingdom: now, they did not need anymore the confirmation of a foreign power¹³. Lewon's legitimacy was based on the crown which he had received from the pope and the German emperor, his power being acknowledged by the most important political actors in Europe and the Levant. There is the possibility that the Het'umids would not gain any advantage from maintaining close relations with Rome. Lewon I did this because he wanted to

⁷ **Smbat Sparapet**, p. 226.

⁸ **Bar Hebraeus**, *The Chronography*, vol. I, Ernest A. Wallis Budge (trans.), Amsterdam, Philo Press, 1976, p. 390; **Levon Ter-Petrossian**, *Խաչակիրները և հայերը (The Crusaders and the Armenians)*, vol. II, Erevan, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 2007, p. 257.

⁹ **Victor Langlois** (ed.), *Le trésor des chartes d'Arménie ou cartulaire de la chancellerie royale des roupéniens*, Venise, Typographie arménienne de Saint-Lazare, 1863, pp. 141-147; **Reinhold Röhricht**, *Regesta regni hierosolymitani (MXCVII – MCCXCI)*, Oeniponti, Libraria Academica Wagneriana, 1893, p. 237; 302.

¹⁰ I have analysed Lewon I's ties with the Holy See during the war of the Antiochene succession in the article "The War of the Antiochene Succession. Lewon I's Game of Diplomacy," in *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, tom. LVII, 1-4, 2019, pp. 221-250.

¹¹ *Regesta Honorii Papae III*, **Petrus Pressutti** (ed.), vol. I, Rome, Typografia Vaticana, 1888, p. 385, 2320.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 476, 2876.

¹³ Unlike Lewon's coronation, when Het'um and Zabel were enthroned the sources do not mention the presence of any foreign official. They were crowned by the catholicos, not by a foreign dignitary, as it happened in 1198 when Lewon received his crown from the hands of Conrad of Wittelsbach, archbishop of Mainz (*Patrologia Latina*, **Jacques-Paul Migne** (ed.), CCXIV, lib. II, CCXIX, p. 778). Het'um had also another problem related to the royal crown: Philip of Antioch (king of Armenia between 1222-1224) sent it to Antioch. It was recovered three decades later, see **Peter Halfter**, « La couronne d'Arménie: un document récemment découverte », in *La Méditerranée des Arméniens XII^e – XV^e siècle*, **Claude Mutafian** (ed.), Paris, Geuthner, 2014, pp. 101-120. For the coronation of Het'um and Zabel, see **Smbat Sparapet**, p. 225; **Kirakos Ganjakec'i**, p. 189.

extend his authority over Antioch. As Kostandin Gundstapl and his son, Het‘um I, did not want to continue fighting over the Latin principality, then there was no other reason for consolidating their links with the Holy See, especially as the pope could not help them against the new enemy of the Armenian monarchy: the Seljukid Sultanate of Rûm. This does not mean that Het‘um I broke off his relations with Rome. Rather than focusing primarily on the Holy See, he decided to leave the door open for any available ally.

The events which occurred in the Orient following Het‘um I’s coronation may also explain why the Armenian monarchy was no longer interested in keeping close links with Rome. Lewon I’s desire to extend his control over Antioch led him to overlook the political situation in Anatolia¹⁴. Gradually, the Seljukid Sultanate of Rûm recovered from the civil war which followed the death of Kaykhusraw I in 1211. Although Lewon I had supported Kaykaus I during the internal disputes from the sultanate¹⁵, in 1216 the Seljuks captured Kapan and took Kostandin Gundstapl and some other nobles as prisoners¹⁶. In an Armenian colophon from 1216 it is written that «Իսկ քրիստոսասէր թագաւորն մեր առաքեալ գրեւորդին իւր զԿոստանդին գունդատապլ զալրաւք սսկաւորք ընդդէմ, առ ի ջթողացուցանել զաւերումն սահմանաց մերոց»¹⁷ (*Therefore our Christ-loving king sending against [them] the son of his maternal uncle*¹⁸, *Kostandin the constable with few troops to not let them pillage our borders*), which could mean that it was not a full-scale invasion, but rather a small expedition, targeting at pillaging the Armenian lands. The Seljuk sources offer a different account of this attack. According to Ibn Bībī, the sultan of Rum was informed about Lewon’s refusal to pay the tribute, thus he sent an army to punish him.

¹⁴ Lewon I concentrated all his resources in the fight for Antioch and used every opportunity to form new alliances. The matrimonial alliance represented an important diplomatic instrument at his disposal and reflected his political ambitions. According to Natasha Hodgson, *Levon’s attitude to dynastic politics was undoubtedly as aggressive as his expansionist activities elsewhere*, see **Natasha Hodgson**, “Conflict and cohabitation: marriage and diplomacy between Latins and Cilician Armenians,” c. 1097-1253», in *The Crusades and the Near East*, **Conor Kostick** (ed.), London, Routledge, 2011, p. 95.

¹⁵ **Rustam Shukurov**, “The Image of Cilician Armenia in Anatolian Muslim Sources,” in *Cilician Armenia in the Perceptions of Adjacent Political Entities*, **A.A. Bozoyan** (ed.), Yerevan: `Gitutyun` Publishing House of the NAS RA, 2018, p. 84.

¹⁶ **Smbat Sparapet**, p. 221-222; **Smbat-Dédéyan**, p. 92.

¹⁷ **A. S. Matevosyan**, *Հայերեն ձեռագրերի հիշատակարաններ, 13th դար* (*Armenian colophons, 13th century*), Erevan, The Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1984, p. 101, colophon 63.

¹⁸ *Զրեւորդի* usually means *son of a sister*, but Claude Mutafian argues that in this colophon, it refers to the *son of a maternal uncle*, see **Claude Mutafian**, *L’Arménie du Levant*, vol. I, Paris, Belles Lettres, 2012, p. 109.

Having heard of the incoming attack, the Armenian king prepared to defend his territories, but the Seljuks managed to conquer the fortress of Kanjī and captured Kostandin of Paperon, Oshin and Noshin. Lewon was forced to sign a peace treaty with Kaykawus I and accepted to pay tribute¹⁹. It is important to mention that according to the colophons from 1216 this event was not as important as the conquest of Antioch by Lewon I, which happened in the same year²⁰. Although this was not a full-scale invasion, it announced future attacks.

Another Seljuk expedition took place in 1221, when Kayqubad I took the harbour of Kalonoros, which he renamed *Alanya* after his name (Alā ad-Dīn Kayqubad bīn Khusraw). The Seljuks continued to advance towards Selefke, but they were stopped there by an army of Hospitallers and Armenians²¹. This attack was followed by others towards the mountainous regions of Cilicia. Initially, having received help from Antioch, the Armenians repelled the enemy. But after the assassination of Philip I in 1225, Bohemund changed sides and decided to assist the Seljuks in their military operations. Thus, Kayqubad I managed to acquire other territories, like the fortress of Janjin and the mountainous massifs between Ermenek and Mut²².

Paul Bedoukian studied some bilingual coins (Armenian and Arabic-script) minted during Het'um I's reign. They may represent the proof of Seljuk suzerainty over the Armenian kingdom. However, Bedoukian considered that it was just a nominal submission to the Seljuks, given that Het'um continued to act freely and when he did assist the sultan, it was just a formal act²³. The analysis of these coins may provide a chronology for the submission of the Armenian king

¹⁹ **Rustam Shukurov**, "The Image of Cilician Armenia in Anatolian Muslim Sources," p. 88. **Sara Nur Yildiz** argues that there are not enough proofs for Lewon's submission to Kaykaus I, see "Reconceptualizing the Seljuk-Cilician Frontier: Armenians, Latins, and Turks in Conflict and Alliance during the Early Thirteenth Century," in *Borders, Barriers, and Ethnogenesis. Frontiers in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, **Florin Curta** (ed.), Turnhout, Brepols, 2005, pp. 101-105.

²⁰ We have two colophons which speak about the conquest of Antioch compared to one which presents the attack of the Seljuks, see *Armenian Colophons*, p. 96, colophon 59; p. 101, colophon 63; p. 103, colophon 65.

²¹ **Claude Mutafian**, *L'Arménie du Levant*, pp. 118-119; **Rustam Shukurov**, "The Image of Cilician Armenia in Anatolian Muslim Sources," pp. 88-89.

²² **Rustam Shukurov**, "The Image of Cilician Armenia in Anatolian Muslim Sources," p. 85; **Sara Nur Yildiz**, "Reconceptualizing the Seljuk-Cilician Frontier," pp. 107-107.

²³ **Paul Bedoukian**, "Bilingual Coins of Hethum I," in *The American Numismatic Society Museum Notes*, VII, 1957, pp. 227-228. Claude Cahen considers that Het'um I provided troops for Kayqubad I during his campaign against the Kwarezmian Shah, Jalal ad-Dīn, see **Claude Cahen**, *The Formation of Turkey. The Seljukid Sultanate of Rum: Eleventh to Fourteenth Century*, Harlow, Pearson Education, 2001, p. 60.

to the Seljuk sultans: it started in 1228 and ended in 1245²⁴. Although Smbat Sparapet, Kirakos Ganjakec'i or other chroniclers from the thirteenth century do not mention Het'um's acceptance of the Seljuk suzerainty²⁵, we may find some information in a colophon from 1228: «Վասն մեղաց մերոց բարկացաւ [անբար]կանալին և խրատե /// մերոյ եւ եհան աշխարհին սուր անպատմելի, զոր տեսաք աշաւք մերովք, զի զհամարն Աստուած միայն գիտէ զկոտորելոցն սրով և զգերելոցն ի ձեռս անարկինաց: Եւ յետ այնր մահ և սով սաստիկ, և այս ամենայն եղև վասն բազմանալոյ անարեւելեանց, զի ոչ գտանի ոք զթիւն պատմէ, քան զի անճառ է»²⁶ (*Because of our sins got angry the one who does not get angry and admonished us and drew out the ineffable sword of the world, which we saw it with our eyes, for only God knows the number of those slaughtered by the sword and those who fell captive in the hands of the infidels. And after that [followed] terrible death and hunger, and all of this was on account of the growth of wrongdoings, so that nobody could find anyone to tell the number, because it is unspeakable*).

Het'um I and his father, Kostandin Gundstapl consolidated the links between the Armenian kingdom and the Empire of Nicaea²⁷. Hrač' Bartikyan presented the negotiations between Sis and Nicaea in the fourth and fifth decades of the thirteenth century. Het'um I sent a message to the Greek patriarch of Antioch, Dorotheus, telling him that he wanted to discuss with the Byzantine emperor the religious union between the Armenian and the Greek churches. When the patriarch of Constantinople, Germanus I, was informed about Het'um's intentions, he decided to send a delegation to Sis. After speaking with John III Vatatzes, the patriarch sent the metropolitan of Melitene, John, to Cilicia, where he delivered a message from Germanus and received a reply, according to which Het'um would soon send a copy of the Armenian confession of faith. Later, an Armenian embassy arrived at Nicaea, and although the patriarchal throne was vacant, John III Vatatzes organised a council where the bishops decided to send John of Melitene back to Cilicia to discuss the union between the two churches with the catholicos. However, when he arrived there, Het'um I told him that Kostandin I had left for Hromkla and it was impossible to gather the bishops in his absence. Thus, John returned to Melitene without any result²⁸. Het'um did not abandon

²⁴ Paul Bedoukian, "Bilingual Coins of Hethum I," p. 220; Sara Nur Yildiz, "Reconceptualizing the Seljuk-Cilician Frontier," pp. 109-110.

²⁵ Claude Mutafian, *L'Arménie du Levant*, p. 119.

²⁶ *Armenian colophons*, p. 155, colophon 112.

²⁷ Lewon I had negotiated a matrimonial alliance with Theodor I Laskaris, see George Akropolites, *The History*, Ruth Macrides (trans.), New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 148.

²⁸ Hrač' Bart'ikyan, "Հայ-Բիւզանդական եկեղեցական յարաբերութիւնները փաստաթղթերում" (*Armenian-Byzantine ecclesiastical relations in documents*), *Փանծասար*, VII, 2002,

his project of religious union between the Armenian and the Greek churches. In the winter of 1247-1248, an Armenian embassy arrived to Nicaea. Most likely, it was led by Hakob vardapet²⁹, about whom Kirakos Ganjakec‘i said that later he was sent to accompany Het‘um in his journey to Karakorum: «եւ իբրև գիտաց մեծ կաթողիկոսն Կոստանդին, եթէ գնաց նա խաղաղութեամբ և դադարեալ է ի Մեծն Հայք, առաքեաց զմեծ վարդապետն Յակոբ՝ զայր բանաւոր և իմաստուն, զոր յառաջագոյն առաքեալ էին վասն սիրոյ և միաբանութեան առ թագաւորն յունաց Յովհաննէս, որ ունէր զկողմանս Ասիոյ և մեծացեալ էր յաւուրսն, և առ պատրիարքն նոցուն»³⁰ (*And when the catholicos Kostandin knew that he [Het‘um I] went peacefully and stopped in Greater Armenia, he sent the great vardapet Yakob [to him], an intelligent and wise man, whom they had sent earlier to John, king of the Greeks who controlled the parts of Asia and who was increasing [in power] in those days, and to their patriarch, [to seek] love and concord*). Again, the negotiations did not produce any results. The Byzantines were consistent with their traditional attitude towards this subject: the Armenians were “heretics” and had to accept the canons of the Fourth Ecumenical Council. On the other side, the Armenian king hoped that the emperor and his bishops would be more indulgent and accept a compromise, which would have been dictated by political necessity. To these was added also the traditional opposition from Greater Armenia, a problem which could never be solved. Thus, these negotiations represented only another unsuccessful attempt at unifying the two churches³¹.

This pro-Byzantine policy might have been caused by various political factors. According to Claude Mutafian, Het‘um I wanted to negotiate with possible allies in order to counterbalance the influence of the Roman papacy in Cilicia and he was motivated to do so by various disputes between the Armenian monarchy and the Holy See³². In the context of a conflict between the king and his uncle, Kostandin of Lampron, the pope intervened on behalf of the latter. He sent

pp. 53-55; **Azat Bozoyan**, “The Evidence of the Byzantine Sources,” in *Cilician Armenia in the Perceptions of Adjacent Political Entities*, **Azat Bozoyan** (ed.), Gitut‘yun Publishing House of the NAS RA, 2019, pp. 59-62.

²⁹ **Hrač‘ Bart‘ikyan**, “Armenian-Byzantine ecclesiastical relations in documents,” pp. 54-55.

³⁰ **Kirakos Ganjakec‘i**, p. 365.

³¹ **Hrač‘ Bart‘ikyan**, “Armenian-Byzantine ecclesiastical relations in documents,” pp. 55-57; **Azat Bozoyan**, *The Evidence of the Byzantine Sources*, pp. 62-69.

³² **Claude Mutafian**, *L’Arménie du Levant*, p. 552.

letters to Het'um and Kostandin Gundstapl asking them to refrain from any action against the lord of Lampron³³. Also, another letter was dispatched to Bohemond VI of Antioch, whom Gregory appointed mediator for this conflict, who had the task to block any hostile actions against Kostandin of Lampron³⁴. Het'um decision was also determined by a political attack from Bohemund VI: in 1237 the prince of Antioch addressed a letter to the pope, complaining that the marriage between Het'um and Zabel was not legal, given their consanguinity³⁵:

Archiepiscopo Nazareno, nec non electo et archidiacono Sidoniensibus significat ad ipsius audientiam, [Bohemundo V], principe Antiocheno, insinuantem, pervenisse C[onstantinum], bajulum regni Armeniae, auctoritate primatis Armeniae, qui «catholicos» nuncupatur, [Isabellam] uxorem quondam Ph[ilippi], ejusdem regni regis, memorati Antiocheni principis germani, eo vivente, invitam et renitentem pro viribus, [Haytoni], ipsius C[onstantini] filio, copulasse, licet, «impediente tertio consanguinitatis gradu» matrimonialiter conjungi nequiverint; et, postquam «hujusmodi contubernium intervenit», dictum Ph[ilippum] ab eodem bajulo fuisse proditorialiter interfectum; unde praedictum principem ab ipso papa cum multa precum instantia postulare ut talis copula, mandante ipso papa, dissolvatur; eis mandat quatenus de hac causa inquirant³⁶ (To the archbishop of Nazareth, who has also been chosen to be archdeacon of the Sidonians, it is shown by the present [letter] that, as it is insinuated by Bohemond V, prince of Antioch, Constantine, bail of the Armenian king, by the authority of the primate of Armenia, who is named catholicos, made Isabella, [who is] hesitant and insecure about men [and was] the wife of the deceased Philip, king of the same kingdom [and] brother of the afore-mentioned prince of Antioch, to have sexual intercourse with Hayton, son of the same Constantin, although they should not unite by marriage, [they] being prevented by the third degree of kinship; and after `such a misalliance happened`, Philip was killed through treason by the same bail; therefore, the afore-mentioned prince [of Antioch] insistently beseeched the pope himself that such a union should be annulled by the pope's command; [he] orders them to investigate this matter).

Bohemond's attack could have brought serious damage to the legitimacy of the Het'umid dynasty, given that Het'um I's authority was guaranteed by his marriage to Zabel, the rightful heiress to the Armenian throne after Lewon I's

³³ Lucien Auvray (ed.), *Registre de Gregoire IX*, tom. II, Paris, Albert Fontemoing, 1907, pp. 536-537, letters 3348-3349.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 537, letter 3451.

³⁵ Claude Mutafian, *L'Arménie du Levant*, p. 560.

³⁶ Lucien Auvray (ed.), *Registre de Gregoire IX*, tom. II, p. 618, letter 3597.

death³⁷. In 1238 Gregory IX decided in favour of a request made by the Latin patriarch of Antioch, who wanted to extend his authority over Cilicia: *Apamiensi et Mamistano archiepiscopis mandat quatenus Armenorum praelatum, qui «catholicos» vulgariter appellabatur, inducant ut, cum tota Armenia in patriarchatu Antiocheno consisteret, patriarchae Antiocheno obedientiam, quam ei denegare dicebatur, exhibeat*³⁸ ([The pope] commands to the archbishops of Apamea and Mamistra to convince the Armenian prelate, who is popularly called catholicos, to remain with the whole of Armenia in the patriarchate of Antioch and to show to the patriarch of Antioch the obedience which he was said to refuse). This pro-Antiochene policy of the Holy See might represent another cause for Het‘um’s decision to negotiate with John III Vatatzes, especially as the Nicaean emperor was not at good terms with Rome³⁹. Claude Mutafian considers that the weak connections between Cilicia and Rome in the first part of Het‘um I’s reign were also caused by the anti-Latin foreign policy of his ancestors from the 12th century⁴⁰. However, the Het‘umids pro-Byzantine foreign policy was meant to help them in their struggle against the Rubenids⁴¹. Now, they ruled the kingdom, and they did not necessarily need to act against Rome due to a certain tradition. Most likely, the above-mentioned actions against Cilicia and the absence of an enemy against which they could have used the help provided by the Holy See led the Het‘umids to search for other allies. Given the problems which Het‘um had had with the Seljuks, John III Vatatzes could have been a better ally than Rome, given

³⁷ Lewon I designated Zabel as his heir in 1219, **Smbat Sparapet** p. 220; **Smbat-Dédéyan**, p. 90.

³⁸ **Lucien Auvray** (ed.), *Registre de Grégoire IX*, tom. II, p. 1098, letter 4466.

³⁹ The alliance between John III Vatatzes and Ivan Asen endangered the newly established Latin empire, thus Gregory IX sent letters to Thibaud of Champagne and Navarre and to the Hungarian authorities urging them to protect Constantinople, see **Francesco Dalla’Aglia**, “Crusading in a Nearer East: The Balkan Politics of Honorius III and Gregory IX (1221-1241),” in **Michel Balard** (ed.), *La Papauté et les croisades/The Papacy and the Crusades*, London and New York, Routledge, 2016, p. 180.

⁴⁰ **Claude Mutafian**, *L’Arménie du Levant*, p. 120.

⁴¹ A colophon from 1190 presents a short history of the Het‘umids and mentions their relations with the Byzantine empire: Ošin I, who ruled Cilicia between 1073-1111, was honoured by Alexios I Komnenos for his good governance of Tarsus; his son, Het‘um II, received the title of *sebastos* and his power grew with the help of John II Komnenos, see *Armenian colophons*, pp. 255-256, colophon 270. According to Gerard Dédéyan, Het‘um II welcomed the Byzantine invasion of Cilicia from 1137-38 as Lewon I had extended his authority over the Het‘umid territories, thus the presence of the imperial armies was a good opportunity to repel the Rubenids, see **Gerard Dédéyan**, *Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés*, vol. 2, Lisbonne, Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 2003, p. 685. Regarding the colophon from 1190, Gerard Dédéyan argues that there were some mistakes, as the writer presented Het‘um II as governor of Tarsus during the First Crusade, when actually he succeeded his father, Ošin I, in 1112, see **Gerard Dédéyan**, *Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés*, pp. 683-684.

that the Empire of Nicaea was bordering the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm.

Everything changed when the Mongols started to conquer the Middle East. In 1220-1221 two mongol armies (*tumans*) led by Subutai and Jebe attacked the Armenian and Georgian lands. King Lasha I and Iwane *Hazarapet* were informed about the arrival of the Mongols and decided to assemble the army. A first battle was fought in an unknown location, after which the king met with the Mongols in the Khunan plain. The invaders obliterated the Georgian army. The Georgian king wanted to avenge his defeat, thus he gathered more troops, but the invaders did not want to fight again and crossed the Caucasian mountains towards the territories controlled by the Kipchaks⁴². The Mongols returned a few years later under the command of Chormaghan. He was ordered to fight against Jalal ad-Dîn, son of Ala ad-Dîn Muhammad II, who re-established the Kwarezmian Empire. After he defeated the sultan, Chormaghan settled in the Mugan plain, which he used as a base to launch a systematic conquest of the Armenian and Georgian provinces: great cities, like Ganjak or Šambor were raided and destroyed by the Mongols⁴³. The Armenian princes had two choices: submit and live to govern their territories; resist and face the destruction of the Mongols. Kirakos relates how Awag, son of Iwane, decided to submit to Chormaghan and in return he could rule his territories and he was also granted protection against Mongol attacks⁴⁴. Other princes followed his example and decided to submit to the Mongols⁴⁵.

Chormaghan was replaced by Baiju *Noyan*, who continued the Mongol advance towards the territories controlled by the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm. After capturing Erzuka and other cities from Western Armenia, the Mongols met with the Seljuks at Kôse Dagh on 26th of June 1243. Kaykhusraw II was defeated and fled the battlefield, leaving the way open for Asia Minor⁴⁶. As we have said earlier, at this time Het'um was under the suzerainty of the Seljuk sultan. This may imply that he had to participate with some troops at the battle of Kôse Dagh⁴⁷.

⁴² **Kirakos Ganjakec'i**, pp. 201-204; **Grigor Aknerc'i**, "History of the Nation of the Archers (The Mongols)", Robert P. Blake and Richard N. Frye (trans.), in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. XII, no.3/4, 1949, pp. 291-295. **Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog**, *The Mongols and the Armenians (1220-1335)*, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2011, pp. 47-50.

⁴³ **Kirakos Ganjakec'i**, pp. 235-237; 241-243.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 254-257.

⁴⁵ **Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog**, *The Mongols and the Armenians*, pp. 71-78.

⁴⁶ **Kirakos Ganjakec'i**, pp. 281-284; **Grigor Aknerc'i**, pp. 307-312.

⁴⁷ According to Bar-Hebraeus, Kostandin Gundstapl went to Caesarea (Kayseri) where he met with the sultan to whom he promised that he would bring many troops to fight together with the Seljuks, see **Bar Hebraeus**, p. 407.

Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog considers that the Armenian king had sent some soldiers, but they arrived too late to take part in the fighting: Het'um decided to aid Kaykhusraw II because he considered the Mongols to be more dangerous than his suzerain⁴⁸. Claude Mutafian argues that the Armenian monarchy decided to refrain from any help which could have been delivered to the Seljuks. When he was informed about the victory of the Mongols, Het'um sent an embassy to Baiju to conclude peace with him⁴⁹. Whether the Armenians participated or not at the battle of Köse Dagh, it is clear that the defeat of the Seljuks determined Het'um to enter negotiations with the Mongols. Kirakos Ganjakec'i and Grigor Aknerc'i first presented the battle of Köse Dagh, and then they described how the Armenian king decided to submit to the Mongols. Grigor states that: «Իսկ բարեպաշտ եւ քրիստոսապսակ թագաւորն հայոց Հեթում հանդերձ ամենայն իմաստութեամբ լցեալ հարբն իւրով եւ աստուածապահ եղբարքն եւ իշխանօքն՝ ի խորհուրդ մտեալ՝ հաստատեցին ՚ի միտս իւրեանց հնազանդել Տաթարին եւ տալ հարկս եւ խալանս, եւ ոչ թողուլ զնոսս յաստուածաշէն եւ ՚ի քրիստոնէաժողով երկիրն իւրեանց»⁵⁰ (*Then the pious and Christ-crowned King of Armenia, Het'um, with his father endowed with all wisdom, and all of his God-fearing brothers and princes, taking counsel, came to the decision to submit to the Tat'ars and give them tribute and xalan so as not to let them into their own God-created and Christ-formed country*). Kirakos linked the defeat of the Seljuks with Het'um's decision to submit to the Mongols: «Իբրեւ այս գործեցաւ, Հեթում արքայ, որ աշխարհին Կիլիկեցոց եւ այնոցիկ նահանգաց իշխէր, յորժամ ետես, եթէ պարտեցաւ սուլտանն առաջի նոցա, առաքեաց առ նոսս դեսպանս եւ պատարագս արժանաւորս՝ զնել նոցա ընդ նմա ուխտ խաղաղութեան, եւ նմա կալ նոցա ի հնազանդութեան»⁵¹ (*Once [this battle] happened, when king Het'um, who ruled the country of Cilicia and those provinces, saw that the sultan was defeated by them [the Tatars], he send ambassadors and worthy gifts to them, so that they would give him a treaty of peace and he would submit in obedience to them*). A colophon from a manuscript copied in Sis in 1244 presents the extent of the Mongol invasions: «Ի ժամանակս աստուածասէր եւ բարեպաշտ տերանց մերոց քրիստոսապսակեալ արքայիս Կիլիկեցոց նահանգիս Հեթմոյ եւ քրիստոսասէր թագուհուն Զապելի, ի դառն եւ

⁴⁸ Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog, *The Mongols and the Armenians*, p. 62. See also, Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey. A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, c. 1071-1330*, trans. J. Jones-Williams, New York, Taplinger Publishing Company, 1968, p. 137; Claude Cahen, *The Formation of Turkey. The Seljukid Sultanate of Rum: Eleventh to Fourteenth Century*, p. 60.

⁴⁹ Claude Mutafian, *L'Arménie du Levant*, pp. 133-134.

⁵⁰ Grigor Aknerc'i, p. 312.

⁵¹ Kirakos Ganjakec'i, pp. 284-285.

յամբարի ժամանակի, յորում անձանաւթ ազգն խուժադուծ, որ կոչին Թաթարք, յելիցն արեւու մինչեւ ի Դամասկոս և ի մեծն Անտիոք և մինչեւ յԻկոնիա առին զարիեգերս յաւար և ի գերութիւն ասպատակաւ»⁵² (*In the time of our God-fearing and pious lord Het'um, the Christ-crowned king of the regions of Cilicia, and Zabel, the God-loving queen, in bitter and bad times, when the unknown and barbarous people, which are called 'Tatars', departing from the East [and arriving] as far as Damascus and the great Antioch and Konya, through raids plundered the whole world and took it captive*).

Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog considers that there were several reasons which stand behind Het'um's decision to submit to the Mongols: the destructions produced by the Mongol armies in the Armenian territories; the fact that the papacy questioned the legitimacy of his marriage with Zabel; the danger of a Muslim invasion launched both from Anatolia and Egypt. In this context, instead of allying with Rome against the Mongols, he decided to submit to the Great Khan⁵³. The danger posed by the Mongols appears also in chronicles and colophons, but the connections between the Armenian monarchy and the Holy See did not represent a possible reason for Het'um's embassy to the Mongols. Innocent IV sent missionaries to the Orient to discuss a possible union with the Oriental Churches only in 1245⁵⁴, thus in 1243 there were no theological demands on behalf of the Holy See. Also, the problem regarding the marriage between Het'um and Zabel had already been overcome⁵⁵. Regarding Egypt, after the defeat of the Latins at La Forbie (12 October 1244), Het'um I decided that the Franks were not powerful enough to fight against the Mongols, thus they did not represent an ally for Cilicia⁵⁶. Still, the sources are clear about Het'um's reasons for submitting to the Mongols: he was afraid that they could invade his kingdom. From this moment on, the Armenian king led a reactive foreign policy: instead of taking the initiative, he had to react to what happened in the Orient. Undoubtedly, his decision to accept the Mongol suzerainty saved the Armenian kingdom. But he had no other choice: to resist the Mongols would have meant the destruction of his country. All he could do to prevent the invasion of Cilicia was to submit to the Great Khan⁵⁷. However, he did not side completely with the Mongols. Rather, he

⁵² *Armenian colophons*, p. 233.

⁵³ **Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog**, *The Mongols and the Armenians*, pp. 65-66.

⁵⁴ **Peter Jackson**, *The Mongols and the West*, London and New York, Routledge, 2014, p. 87; 93-94.

⁵⁵ **Claude Mutafian**, *L'Arménie du Levant*, p. 561.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 135.

⁵⁷ Angus Stewart considers that a paragraph from Smbat's chronicle could mean that Het'um I had submitted to the Mongols prior to the battle of Köse Dag, see **Angus Stewart**, "Alliance with the

waited to observe what happened next, especially as he received an embassy from Rome in 1246.

All these sources present the dire situation Het'um faced. As the Mongols defeated the Seljuks and some of them even arrived in the territories around Damascus and Antioch, it seemed certain that soon Cilicia could have become a target. The embassy to Baiju from 1243 was just a temporary solution, given that he was just a local commander of the Mongols armies in the western territories. Thus, the Armenian king decided to send his brother, Smbat, to Karakorum. We know that in 1246 Smbat left for Karakorum, where he arrived in 1248 and returned to Cilicia in 1250. His embassy was a success: Cilicia was to be protected from future attacks. However, the Khan required Het'um's personal submission⁵⁸. Smbat dispatched a letter to Henry I of Cyprus and John of Ibelin telling them that Güyük and his entourage were already Christians, and given the importance of the information, his message was forwarded to Rome⁵⁹. Thus, the journey of the Armenian constable to the court of the Great Khan brought hope to Cilicia, but also to the Christian world: there was a slight possibility that the Mongols could cooperate with the Latins.

The papacy had a three-fold strategy against the menace posed by the Mongols. The first one was represented by the missions sent in the Mongol territories. Innocent IV dispatched three friars to the East with the mission of preaching the Gospel and gathering intelligence: Giovanni da Pian del Carpine went to Karakorum, where he witnessed the enthronement of Güyük Khan, Ascelin of Cremona met with Baiju *Noyan* and Andrew of Longjumeau arrived in Tabriz, where he delivered the pope's letter to a Mongol general⁶⁰. The second strategy was represented by attempts to unite the Eastern Churches with Rome. Innocent IV wanted to use the Mongol threat to bring the Oriental Christians under his authority⁶¹. Thus, these embassies had also to negotiate with the patriarchs from the territories which were controlled by the Mongols. This policy bore fruit: in 1247 Ignatius II acknowledged the Roman primacy and Simeon Rabban-ata forwarded to the Holy See the confession of faith of the Nestorian patriarch⁶². The third

Tartars: the Armenian kingdom, the Mongols and the Latins," in *La Méditerranée des Arméniens XII^e-XV^e siècle*, *Claude Mutafian* (ed.), Paris, Geuthner, 2014, p. 208:

⁵⁸ **Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog**, *The Mongols and the Armenians*, pp. 80-85.

⁵⁹ **Caesar Baronius**, *Annales ecclesiastici*, tom. 21, Paris, 1870, p. 372, letter 36; **Peter Jackson**, *The Mongols and the West*, p. 98.

⁶⁰ **Jean Richard**, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient au Moyen-Âge*, Rome, École française de Rome, 1977, pp. 70-72.

⁶¹ **Peter Jackson**, *The Mongols and the West*, pp. 93-94.

⁶² *Ibidem*.

strategy was to use the preaching of the crusade against the Mongols⁶³. In 1241 Gregory IX launched a call for a crusade against the Mongols⁶⁴, but it did not produce the expected results⁶⁵. However, this policy was continued by Innocent IV: in a letter from 1243 addressed to Berthold, patriarch of Aquileia, the pope stated that the vows for the crusades in the Holy Land could be commuted for the campaigns against the Mongols⁶⁶.

In the light of the above-mentioned facts about the policy of the Holy See towards the Mongols, the act of adopting the *filioque* doctrine by the Armenian church in 1251 seems to be odd. Smbat returned from the Khan's court with hope, as it appeared that the latter was favourable to Christians. A rapprochement towards Rome meant that the crusade preaching supported by the Holy See could have damaged the relations between Cilicia and the Mongol Empire. Given the importance of the links between the Armenian monarchy and Karakorum after 1243, the reason behind the summoning of the council of Sis in 1251 could be related to something that happened in the Mongol world. It is important to say that the Armenian and the Roman Churches were not in cordial relations at that time. Innocent IV sent Dominic of Aragon, a Franciscan friar, to discuss theological matters with unbelievers and the Christians who did not acknowledge the authority of the Holy See⁶⁷. He arrived in Cilicia and brought a letter from the pope, its content arousing theological debate which later led to the council of Sis (1251)⁶⁸. The catholicos answered with another letter, written by the famous vardapet Vardan Areweltsi, which contained 15 errors of the Roman church, starting with the primacy of the Holy See⁶⁹. The tone of the letter shows resentment towards the pope: «*Կարծես զհայոց եկեղեցի սղբսւն ի զհոսոյթանէ*»⁷⁰ (*They think we have poor knowledge*). Vardan Arewelc'i considered that although the *filioque* doctrine is based on biblical arguments, it would have been

⁶³ *Ibidem*, pp. 104-105.

⁶⁴ Gregory IX, *Vocem in excelso*, in *Crusade and Christendom. Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187-1291*, Jessalyn Bird, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell (eds.), Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, pp. 319-323.

⁶⁵ For the crusade of 1241, see Peter Jackson, "The Crusade Against the Mongols (1241)," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, vol. 42, 1991, pp. 1-18.

⁶⁶ *Monvmenta Germaniae Historica, Epp. Saec. XIII, Carolus Rodenberg* (ed.), tom. II, Berlin, 1887, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁷ Eugène Tisserant, «*Légation en Orient du franciscain Dominique d'Aragon*», *Revue de l'Orient chrétien*, 24, p. 338.

⁶⁸ Claude Mutafian, «*Franciscains et Arméniens (XIII^e – XIV^e siècle)*», *Studia Orientalia Christiana*, vol. XXXIX, 1999, pp. 229-231.

⁶⁹ Գրքը թղթոց (*Book of letters*), Tiflis, 1901, pp. 503-509.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 503.

better not to use this formulation because it would have led to confusion⁷¹. When Het‘um received this letter, he decided not to send it to Rome, so as not to damage his connections with the pope⁷². Also, it is possible that the news of a new crusade could have determined him to maintain a friendly relation with the Holy See⁷³.

At this moment, it seems that Het‘um I’s connections with the Mongols were not as strong as we might think, and the convocation of the council of Sis in 1251 might represent an attempt to maintain a balance between Rome and Karakorum. According to Kirakos Ganjakec‘i, the pope asked the catholicos and the Armenian king whether they confessed that the Holy Spirit proceeded only from the Father, or from the Father and the Son. They convened a council in Sis which was attended also by clerics from Greater Armenia. Although Vardan Arewelc‘i rejected the *filioque* doctrine, now the participants at the council decided that there were enough arguments in the Holy Scriptures and the writings of the Holy Fathers in order to accept that the Holy Spirit emanated from the Father and the Son⁷⁴. Most likely, this matter was addressed by the letter which Dominic of Aragon brought to Cilicia in 1246⁷⁵. Thus, Het‘um did not convene this council when he received the letter from the pope but waited until 1251. Louis IX’s presence in the Orient might have determined the Armenian king to take active steps towards consolidating his relations with the Holy See, and implicitly, with Europe⁷⁶. Undoubtedly, Smbat’s letter to Henry I of Cyprus and John of Ibelin and the embassy sent by Eljigidei to meet with the French king represented an attempt to create an alliance between the Mongols and the Latins, albeit an ephemeral one⁷⁷. However, Denise Aigle analysed the letters sent by the Khans and addressed to Innocent IV and Louis IX between 1246-1254 and concluded that they represented invitations to submission to the Mongols⁷⁸. Only after 1261 did the Il-Khans from Iran decided to negotiate an alliance with the West⁷⁹. In this context, given that the purpose was not represented by mediating an alliance between Rome and Karakorum, Het‘um I could have convened the council because he

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p. 504; **Sergio LaPorta**, “The *Filioque* Controversy in Armenia”, in *St. Nerses Theological Review*, vol. 8, 2003, pp. 88-89.

⁷² **Krzysztof Stopka**, *Armenia Christiana. Armenian Religious Identity and the Churches of Constantinople and Rome (4th-15th century)*, Krakow, Jagiellonian University, 2016, pp. 164-165.

⁷³ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁴ **Kirakos Ganjakec‘i**, pp. 329-333. Although Vardan Arewelc‘i rejected the *filioque* doctrine, his master, Vanakan vardapet, considered it to be valid, see **Sergio LaPorta**, “The *Filioque* Controversy in Armenia”, pp. 90-91.

⁷⁵ **Claude Mutafian**, « Franciscains et Arméniens (XIII^e – XIV^e siècle) », pp. 230-231.

⁷⁶ **Claude Mutafian**, *L’Arménie du Levant*, pp. 563-564.

⁷⁷ **Peter Jackson**, *The Mongols and the West*, pp. 98-99.

⁷⁸ **Denise Aigle**, « De la «non-négociation» à l’alliance inaboutie. Réflexions sur la diplomatie entre les mogols et l’occident latin », *Oriente Moderno*, 1998, LXXXVIII, pp. 402-403.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 403-404; **Peter Jackson**, *The Mongols and the West*, p. 165.

was not sure about the protection which Güyük had offered him. Güyük's death led to internal strife among the Mongols. His widow, Oghul Qaimish continued to rule until a *kurultai* would elect the next Khan. Oghul wanted to place her son, Qoutcha, on the throne, but she met with the opposition led by Batu Khan, who considered himself to be the leader of the Genghiskhanid dynasty. He supported Sorgaqtani, Tolui's widow, thus the Toluids ascended the throne. The first *kurultai*, convened in 1250, was inconclusive, given the absence of members from the families of Ögedei and Chagatai. The second *kurultai* also failed to elect a new Khan. Only a third *kurultai*, convened by Berke, Batu's brother, named Möngke Great Khan⁸⁰. These quarrels among the Mongols were known in the East. Kirakos Ganjakec'i presented the disputes which followed Güyük's death and also Batu's role in the election of Möngke Khan⁸¹. Even the Westerners were informed about them. Matthew of Paris mentioned an Armenian embassy who arrived at St. Albans, where they presented how God vengeance fell upon the Tatars by making them to fight one against the other⁸². These internal quarrels could have determined Het'um to maintain good relations with the West. Although Smbat was welcomed by Güyük, it did not necessarily mean that the protection which was offered to him had to continue after the Khan's death. The presence of a crusader army in Cyprus and, later, in Egypt represented a proof of the Westerners' interest in the East⁸³. Thus, at that moment, Het'um could not choose between the West or the Mongols. Although the adoption of the *filioque* doctrine did not produce any change in the Armenian Church, it represented another attempt of the monarchy to make concessions towards the Roman Church hoping that it might offer a certain degree of security. Het'um I may have decided to make this concession towards Rome in view of a possible alliance that would have ensured the security of his kingdom if his treaty with Güyük had not been valid after the his death, which meant that Cilicia would have remained unprotected from future Mongol attacks. Only Het'um's journey to Karakorum and his subsequent participation in the Mongol invasion of Syria sealed the peace between him and the Great Khan.

As we can see, Het'um I had a dynamic foreign policy, but it was different from what happened during Lewon I's reign. The first Armenian king led an active foreign policy: during the war of the Antiochene succession, Lewon started

⁸⁰ René Grousset, *L'empire des steppes*, Paris, Payot, 1939, pp. 339-340.

⁸¹ Kirakos Ganjakec'i, pp. 356-359.

⁸² Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, edited by Henry Richards Luard, vol. V, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 340.

⁸³ Louis IX also helped Het'um to make peace with Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli, thus ending the conflict over the Antiochene principality, which had started during Lewon I's reign, see Sergio LaPorta, "The *Filioque* Controversy in Armenia", p. 91.

to negotiate with the Holy See⁸⁴. He also got the support of the Teutonic knights⁸⁵ and created strong links with the Cypriote monarchy⁸⁶. He even tried to form an alliance with Theodore I Laskaris, in an attempt to block any advantage which Bohemund IV could have received from his connections with the Latin emperor of Constantinople⁸⁷. We can say that Lewon had a strategy for his kingdom: to extent his control over Antioch. He had the opportunity to lead such an active foreign policy because his neighbours were weak. The Latin states were greatly reduced by Saladin's attacks. After the death of the Ayyubid sultan, his empire was divided among his children, who started to quarrel among themselves. The Seljukid Sultanate of Rum was also weakened by the wars between Kaykhusraw I and his brothers. Thus, Lewon could pursue his objectives without meeting with strong opposition. Except for his negotiations with the Empire of Nicaea, Het'um I could not lead such an active foreign policy, especially after the arrival of the Mongols. According to the colophon written in Sis in 1244, the Mongols had already devastated the territories of Damascus, Antioch, and Konya. He had no other option, but to submit to the Khan. Regarding the events from 1246-1251, Het'um did not have the initiative towards the Holy See, but rather he acted at the pope's request and what he did was influenced by the events which happened in the Orient. The Armenian kingdom was caught in between Rome and Karakorum: Het'um had to protect Cilicia by maintaining a balance between the two of them. He was not sure about the support of the Khan, thus he could not break his ties with the West. Until he received a clear answer from Karakorum, it was better to continue to negotiate with the pope. He could not lead the foreign policy of his monarchy in an active way; all he could do was to react to the political changes resulted from the actions of the West or the Mongol Empire.

Het'um I's attitude towards Rome changed following his journey to Karakorum and the participation of the Armenian kingdom in the invasion of Syria (1259-1260). Hülegü, the first Ilkhan of Persia, extended and consolidated the Mongol influence in the Orient by eliminating the Order of the Assassins (1256) and conquering Baghdad, ending the existence of the Abbasid caliphate⁸⁸. He

⁸⁴ *Patrologia Latina*, tom. CCXIV, lib. II, p. 809-813, letter CCLII.

⁸⁵ **V. Langlois**, *Les trésor des chartes d'Arménie*, pp. 117-120. For the relations between Lewon and the Teutonic Order see **Marie-Anna Chevalier**, « Les chevaliers teutoniques en Cilicie: «les macabées» du Royaume arménien », *Bizantinistica. Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi*, 2004, Fondazione Centro Italiano di Studi Sull'alto Medioevo, pp. 137-153.

⁸⁶ **Smbat Sparapet**, p. 217; **Smbat-Dédéyan**, p. 87.

⁸⁷ In 1204 Bohemond IV of Tripoli paid homage to the wife of Baldwin of Flanders, the future Latin emperor of Constantinople, see **Albericus de Trium Fontanum**, *Ex Chronico Alberici Trium-Fontanum Monachi*, in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, **Léopold Delisle** (ed.), tom. 28, Paris, Institut de France et de la Légion d'Honneur, 1879 p. 769.

⁸⁸ For the destruction of the Assassins, see **Juvayni**, *History of the World-Conqueror*, **John Andrew Boyle** (trans.), vol. II, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958, pp. 318-340. For the conquest

wanted to bring Syria and Palestine under the control of the Mongols, thus he organized an expedition in 1259. The army was composed by Mongols and Christians (Armenians from Greater Armenia and Cilicia, Georgians, and Franks) and conquered Aleppo, Damascus and even got close to Jerusalem⁸⁹. Although in the beginning it seemed that the Mongols could even conquer Jerusalem and attacks the Mamluks, Hülegü's retreat left in Syria only a small army under the command of Kitbugha, one of his generals. What happened next is well-known: the Mamluks won the battle, marking the end of the Mongol expansion in the Middle East⁹⁰. In the following decades various Ilkhans invaded Syria, but without acquiring significant results. However, in 1260 the situation did not look so bad, as we can see from the actions of Het'um I. He led several expeditions into northern Syria in the following years, and for one of them he even dressed his soldiers with Mongol garments⁹¹. Thus, for the Armenian king the expedition from 1259-1260 did not represent the beginning of the end for the Mongol expansionism. Rather, it offered him hope: his new suzerains involved actively in the oriental politics. He even entered Aleppo, something which no other Christian monarch had done in centuries⁹². In this context, he did not need to maintain good relations with the papacy. Het'um I's participation in the Mongol invasion sealed his alliance with the Great Khan: he had submitted to them and in return was protected both from Mongol attacks and invasions from the neighbouring countries. Thus, in 1263⁹³ when Mkhitar Skewrats'i, a representative of the catholicos, met with Thomas of Lentini, bishop of Bethlehem and pontifical legate in the Levant, the former could repeat what Vardan had written in the letter from 1246: the Holy See did not have any authority over other churches, thus rejecting the primacy of the pope⁹⁴. The choice of Mkhitar as a delegate for the Armenian catholicos represented a concession towards the anti-unionist clerics from Greater Armenia, who for a long time protested against any

of Baghdad see **Kirakos Ganjakec'i**, pp. 377-384; **Smbat Sparapet**, pp.235-236; **Smbat-Dédéyan**, pp. 104-106; **Vardan Arewelts'i**, *Պատմությունը հիկարական (Universal history)*, **Mkrtich Ēmin** (ed.), Moscow, 1861, p. 197.

⁸⁹ **Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog**, *The Mongols and the Armenians*, pp. 135-140.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 143-147. The Mamluk-Ilkhanid war ended in 1320, when Abu Sa'id, the last Ilkhan, signed a treaty with the Mamluks. For an analysis of the battle of Ayn Jalut, see **Amitai-Preiss Reuven**, "Ayn Jālūt Revisited", in *Tārīh*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 119-150.

⁹¹ **Amitai Reuven**, "Dangerous Liaisons: Armenian-Mongol-Mamluk Relations (1260-1292)," in **Claude Mutafian**, ed. *La Méditerranée des Arméniens*, Paris, Geuthner, 2014, pp. 195-196.

⁹² **Amitai Reuven**, "Dangerous Liaisons," pp. 193-194; **Claude Mutafian**, *L'Arménie du Levant*, pp. 146-147. Bar Hebraeus noted how T'oros, probably Het'um's son, saved some of the Syriac Christians from the massacres executed by the Mongols, see **Bar Hebraeus**, p. 436.

⁹³ According to Claude Mutafian, the debate between Mxitar Skewrac'i and Thomas of Lentini took place in 1263, see **Claude Mutafian**, *L'Arménie du Levant*, vol. I, p. 564.

⁹⁴ *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Documents arméniennes*, tom. I, Paris, 1869, p. 697.

attempt of uniting the Armenian Church with either Constantinople, or Rome⁹⁵.

The benefits resulted from the submission to the Mongols did not last long. A devastating invasion in 1266 led to the death of T'oros, Het'um's son, and to the capture of Lewon, his heir⁹⁶. It seems that the king suffered so much, that in the last years of his reign he only tried to free his son⁹⁷. The Mamluks invaded Cilicia again in 1275 and after the failure of a second Mongol invasion of Syria (1281), Lewon II sued for peace and concluded a ten-year treaty with Qalawun⁹⁸. The disappointment of the Armenians towards the Mongols was voiced in a poem composed by Het'um II, where he complained that their allies did not come to help them⁹⁹. The end of the 13th century brought even more problems for the Armenian monarchy. The fall of Antioch, Tripoli and Acre meant that Cilicia was the next target for the Mamluks. In this context, the monarchy returned to the West: Nicholas IV issued a call for crusade with the purpose of protecting the Armenian kingdom¹⁰⁰. The Ilkhan Ghazan once again gave hope to Armenians by leading three invasions into Syria. But these too ended in failure¹⁰¹. Thus, in 1307 in a council convened in Sis the Armenian Church acknowledged all ecumenical councils, a concession which was meant to bring aid from the West¹⁰². The Mongol interlude did not last long, and the Armenian monarchy returned to the West. If in the 12th and 13th centuries the Armenians were in a position of strength when they negotiated with the Holy See, now Rome had the advantage and could ask the Armenian monarchy and the catholicosate to operate more theological changes in order to consolidate their union with the Roman Church.

⁹⁵ **Fr. Tournebize**, *Histoire politique et religieuse de l'Arménie*, tom. I, *Depuis les origines des arméniens jusqu'à la mort de leur dernier roi (l'an 1393)*, Paris, Typographie Firmin-Didot et C^{ie}, 1900, p. 293.

⁹⁶ **Smbat Sparapet**, pp. 245-248.

⁹⁷ **Smbat Sparapet**, pp. 248-249; **Smbat-Dédéyan**, pp. 119-120.

⁹⁸ See **Victor Langlois**, *Le trésor des chartés d'Arménie*, pp. 217-231.

⁹⁹ *Զի յորս էաք մեք ապաստան/ Ազգ նետողացն հեղացան* (*That our refuge was in them/But the Mongols were late*), see *Poème de Héthoum II*, in *RHC. Documents arméniennes*, vol. I, p. 552.

¹⁰⁰ **Ernest Langlois** (ed.), *Registre de Nicholas IV*, vol. II, Paris : Ernest Thörin, 1891 p. 913, letters 6850-6856. Boniface VIII tried to convince some of the European rulers to send aid to Cilicia, see **Georges Digard, Maurice Faucon, Antoine Thomas, Robert Fawtier** (eds.), *Les registres de Boniface VIII*, tom. II, Georges Digard (ed.), Paris, E. de Boccard, 1904, p. 174, 2653-2654.

¹⁰¹ **Peter Jackson**, *The Mongols and the West*, p. 170.

¹⁰² **Joannes Dominicus Mansi**, *Sacrorum conciliorum*, XXV, Venetiis, 1782, pp. 133-134.

ԳԱՎԻԹ ՆՆԱԳՈՒ

ՀԵԹՈՒՄ Ա.-Ը ՄՈՆՂՈՒԼԱԿԱՆ ԿԱՅՍՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԵՎ
ՍՈՒՐԲ ԱԹՈՌԻ ՄԻՋԵՎ

Բանալի բառեր՝ Հեթում Ա, Կոստանդին Բարձրբերդցի, «և որդույ» (filioque), Կիլիկիայի հայկական թագավորություն, Մոնղոլական կայսրություն, եկեղեցական բանակցություններ:

1241 թ. մոնղոլները ներխուժեցին Կենտրոնական Եվրոպա: Մեկ տարի անց, մտնելով Սելջուկների իշխանության տակ եղած գավառները, սկսեցին գրավել տարբեր ֆաղաֆներ նաև Հայաստանում: Հեթում Ա.-ը պետք է որոշեր՝ կովե՞լ նրանց դեմ, թե՞ հնազանդվել մեծ խանի իշխանությանը: Գիտենք, որ նա փրկեց հայկական թագավորությունը՝ ընդունելով մոնղոլական գերիշխանությունը: Այնուամենայնիվ, 1243 թ. սելջուկների պարտությունը և այն անորոշությունները, որոնք առաջ եկան հայկական թագավորության համար, Հեթումին ստիպեցին կրկին որոնել Հռոմի պապի աջակցությունը: 1251 թ. Սսում հրավիրված հոգևորական ժողովում ընդունվեց «և որդույ» (filioque) հավելումը հավատո հանգանակում, ինչը նշանակում էր զիջում Սուրբ Աթոռին և, ամենայն հավանականությամբ, պետք է ծառայեր որոշակի ֆաղաֆական նպատակների: Տասը տարի անց՝ 1259-1260 թթ., Հեթում Ա.-ը մասնակցեց մոնղոլների՝ Ասորիք ներխուժմանը, որից հետո Հայոց թագավորն ու կաթողիկոսը որոշեցին, որ պապական աջակցությունն այլևս անհրաժեշտ չէ:

Հոգվածում փորձել ենք ներկայացնել, թե ինչպես Քյոսե Դաղի (1243) հակատամարտից հետո Հեթումը հավասարակշռություն էր պահպանում խանի և պապի միջև, նաև պատասխանել հետևյալ հարցերին՝ ինչո՞ւ Հեթումը ընդունեց «և որդույ» (filioque) դավանանքը և ի՞նչ պատահեց 1260 թվականից հետո, երբ հայկական կողմը հրաժարվեց Հռոմի հետ դաշնակցությունից:

ДАВИД НЕАГУ

ГЕТУМ I МЕЖДУ МОНГОЛЬСКОЙ ИМПЕРИЕЙ И СВЯТЫМ ПРЕСТОЛОМ

Ключевые слова: Гетум I, Константин Бардзрбердци, “и от Сына” (filioque), Киликийское армянское царство, Монгольская империя, церковные переговоры.

В 1241 г. монголы вторглись в Центральную Европу. Через год они стали нападать на находящиеся во власти сельджуков провинции и занимать города также в Армении. Гетум I оказался перед дилеммой: либо сразиться с ними, либо покориться власти великого хана. Известно, что он спас армянское царство, признав суверенитет монголов. Тем не менее поражение сельджуков в 1243 г. и возникшая для армянского царства неопределенность заставили Гетума вновь искать заступничества Римского Папы. В 1251 году церковный собор в Сисе принял дополнение “и от Сына” (filioque) в символе веры, что было уступкой Святому престолу, по всей вероятности, с политической целью. Через десять лет, в 1259-1260 гг., Гетум I принял участие во вторжении монголов в Сирию, после чего армянские царь и католикос решили, что заступничество Папы более не нужно.

В статье мы попытались представить, как после битвы при Кесе-даге (1243) Гетум поддерживал равновесие между ханом и Папой, а также ответить на следующие вопросы: почему Гетум принял дополнение “и от Сына” (filioque) и что случилось после 1260 года, когда армянская сторона отказалась от сотрудничества с Римом?